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I. INTRODUCTION

Throughout our nation's history, Americans have struggled with the
convergence of freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment and the need for
secrecy of government actions designed to protect the security of the United
States.' Historically, the First Amendment was deemed a necessary addition to
the Constitution in order to effectuate a government "by the people" and to
ensure that tyranny would not go unnoticed.2 These concerns remain centuries
after the First Amendment's adoption.' As evidenced by the September 11th
(hereinafter 9-11) terrorist attacks on America, the need for secrecy in national
defense is arguably at its all time greatest.4 When coupled with the age of high
speed and highly technical access to information, it is no surprise that the leaders
of this country demand that the press, public access to information, and the
spread of information, all of which may be particularly sensitive to national
defense, are restricted in some manner.'
This comment will address the history underlying the constitutionally
guaranteed First Amendment freedoms and the effects on those freedoms
following the 9-11 terrorist attacks. Part II will address the historical role of the
Court and Congress in limiting access to information for purposes of national
security, while ensuring those limitations do not offend the guarantees provided
in the Constitution. Part III documents some restrictive actions taken in response
to 9-11 that potentially infringe on First Amendment rights. Part IV concludes
this comment by addressing whether the restrictions placed on the freedom of the
press and the public's right to access information run counter to the First
Amendment or whether such restrictions are sanctioned to protect the security of
the nation.
11.

THE HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE FREEDOMS

ENUMERATED IN THE FIRST AMENDMENT

A. Freedom of the Press: From English Law and the FirstAmendment to the
Pentagon Papers
The current state of the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press
can best be seen by reviewing its history and the struggle to maintain it.

I. See infra Part II (comparing the historical background of First Amendment freedoms and the
limitations on those freedoms in the name of national security).
2. See infra Part I.A (discussing the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press).
3. See infra Part Ill (discussing the contemporary need for the First Amendment freedoms afforded to
the public and press and the concurrent need for limitations on those freedoms for purposes of national security
following the September 11,2001 terrorist attacks on America).
4. Id.
5. See infra Part IlI (discussing various restrictions placed on public access to information at the request
of government leaders following 9-11).
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1. Suppression ofFreedom Under English Law
The protections afforded under the Constitution arose from the reaction of
the framers to the restraint of free speech and press under English law. 6 Several
forms of prior restraint were used to keep ideas deemed "obnoxious" at bay,
including licensing, the threat of punishment for constructive treason, and the law
of seditious libel .
Following the introduction of printing in England in 1476, the English
government was greatly concerned about the publication of "undesirable
opinions."' As a result, the crown claimed the right to control all printed
material.9 All publications were submitted to government officials who reviewed
the written work and censored any "objectionable passages." The officials were
authorized by the crown to either deny or approve a license to publish the work."
Publication without an official license or "imprimatur" was considered a criminal
act.' 2 Licensing remained a part of English law until 1725, when the authorizing
legislation expired. 3
Another method used to control written or printed works deemed undesirable
was the threat of punishment for "constructive treason.' 4 Although abandoned in
1720 because the law and its corresponding punishment of death were deemed
too drastic, before that date constructive treason served as a serious reminder to
printers who considered violating the law. 5 In one notable case, a printer was
hanged, drawn, and quartered for possession of proofs of a book which suggested
the "king was 6accountable to the people, and that the people were entitled to self
governance.'
English law also prohibited criticism of the government through the use of
the doctrine of seditious libel which prohibited "any false news or tales whereby
discord or occasion of discord or slander may grow between the king and his

6. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 11.1.1, 748 (Aspen Law
& Business 1997).
7. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 993 (4th ed. 2001).
8. Id.; see generally LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS chs. 3-15 (Oxford University
Press 1985); FRED SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND 1476-1776, 41-87, 127-269 (University of
Illinois Press at Urbana 1952) (discussing the system of "prior restraint" and the subsequent expiration without
renewal of the English laws governing publication).
9. STONE, supra note 7, at 993.
10. Id. at 993-94.
11. Id.at 994.
12. Id.
13. Id. at995.
14. Id at 994. English law, as enumerated in the statute 25 Edward 111(1352) defined treason as "(1)
compassing or imagining the king's death, (2) levying war against theking, or (3) adhering to his enemies." Id.
English judges extended the law of treason to cover written and printed matter in the seventeenth century. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.; see also SIEBERT, supra note 8, at 265-69 (discussing the law of treason and describing the case
of John Twyn, the first English printer tobe tried and convicted under the expanded law of treason).
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people or the great men of the realm."" The doctrine was expanded in 1606 to
include criminal punishment not only for false libel, but also for true libel, which
was considered far worse because it could not be disproved. 8 The doctrine of
seditious libel was considered necessary because, as "explained by Chief Justice
Holt in 1704, '[i]f people should not be called to account for possessing [others]
with an ill opinion of the government, no government can subsist. For it is very
necessary for all governments that the people should have a good opinion of
it.'19

The English laws of licensing, constructive treason, and seditious libel likely
deterred the voicing of any ill opinions contrary to the government of England.
Similarly, prior to the drafting of the Constitution, Colonial American dissenters
likely felt the ill effects of censorship of ideas deemed pernicious to the
government.
2. Suppression of Dissent in ColonialAmerica
Early American colonial law governing freedom of expression imitated the
laws of England. 0 While fewer prosecutions for seditious libel occurred,2'
renegades were discouraged and prosecutions for "seditious expression"
continued."
In a noteworthy colonial case, James Franklin, Benjamin Franklin's older
brother, was prosecuted and convicted for "High affront to this Government."23
Franklin published a notice in the New England Courant stating that the
government was preparing to send a ship after coastal pirates "sometime this
month, wind and weather permitting. 24 The Massachusetts Assembly considered
this an insinuation that the government was not effectively dealing with the
pirates and imprisoned Franklin for the rest of the session."

17.
18.
19.
20.

See STONE, supranote 7, at 994 (quoting Sir Edward Coke's report of a Star Chamber case of 1606).
Id.
Id. (quoting Rex v. Tutchin, 14 Howell's State Trials 1095, 1128 (1704)).
See STONE, supra note 7, at 995 (showing that colonial America had its own trials for seditious

libel).
21. Id. One of the most noteworthy colonial prosecutions for seditious liable was that of John Peter
Zenger, the publisher of the New York Weekly Journal, in 1735. Zenger was accused of criticizing the
Governor General of New York. Id. His argument, made by his attorney, Alexander Hamilton, was that the truth
should be an absolute defense to the crime of seditious libel. Id. The court rejected this argument, but the jury
disregarded the judge's instructions and the law and found Zenger "not guilty." Id. See CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 6, at 749 (noting that while there were fewer seditious libel trials in America than in England, America had
other ways of controlling objectionable speech). For a more detailed discussion of this famous trial, please see
also VINCENT BURANELLI, THE TRIAL OF PETER ZENGER (New York University Press 1957).

22. STONE, supranote 7, at 995.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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Although not bound by English law, a colonial American community "tended
to. be a~tight little island clutching its own respective orthodoxy and... eager to
banish or extralegally punish unwelcome dissidents."26 Debate continues over
whether the drafting of the First Amendment was in response to the continuing
suppression of free speech, deemed essential to a government "of the people," or
whether the drafters were merely rejecting the prior constraint of the English
law.27 In either case, by the end of the eighteenth century, freedom of speech was
guaranteed by the Constitution, and the laws of England consisting of prior
restraint on publication were in effect abandoned."
3. The FirstAmendment and Following
In 1791 the First Amendment was added to the Constitution providing,
"[c]ongress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press .... 2 9 On its face the language appears absolute. However, the Supreme
Court has never accepted this view.3 ° In fact, substantial disagreement exists
concerning the intent of the drafters.3 One theory is that the drafters intended to
adopt the "Blackstonian" view that the freedoms enumerated are, in essence,
freedoms from prior restraint on publication or licensing.32 Others argue that the
framers must have had a different intent than merely the riddance of licensing, as
that law expired in England in 1695 and in colonial America by 1725."3 There
may never be agreement on the intent of the drafters of the First Amendment.
However, not more than seven years following the amendment, in 1798,

26. LEVY, supranote 8, at 16.
27. See id. at 12-15 (stating that the commonly accepted conclusion that the framers of the First
Amendment intended to abolish the law of seditious libel is in error); c.f ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE
SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 18 (Harvard University Press 1941) (noting that the framers of the First
Amendment were not as concerned with the continuation of the English licensing laws, which had expired by
1725, as they were with the danger presented to political writers and speakers, who were frequently prosecuted
under the law of seditious libel).
28. See infra Part II.A.3.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
30. See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976) (noting that restraints on the freedoms of the First
Amendment are permissible for "appropriate reasons").
31. STONE, supra note 7, at 995-96.
32.

Id.; see also WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTARIES

ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

151-52

(Callaghan and Company 1899) (summarizing the law of seditious libel as follows:
The liberty of the press ... consists in laying no previous restraints upon publication, and not
in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published... [t]o subject the press to the
restrictive power of a licenser ... is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one
man, and make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points in learning,
religion, and government. But to punish (as the law does at present) any dangerous or offensive
writings, which, when published, shall on a fair and impartial trial be adjudged of a pernicious
tendency, is necessary for the preservation of peace and good order, of government and
religion, the only solid foundations of civil liberty.).
33. See CHAFEE, supra note 27, at 18-20 (propounding the argument that the drafters intended to address
the fear of prosecution for seditious libel of political writers and speakers through the FirstAmendment).
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Congress adopted the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798 14 with the participation of
many of the Constitution's drafters and ratifiers.35
The Alien and Sedition Act, enacted in response to hostility surrounding the
impending war with France,36 prohibited the publication of "false, scandalous and
malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States, or
either house of the Congress of the United States, or the President of the United
States ...

However, unlike earlier English law, the Act provided for a defense

of truth and required the establishment of malicious intent for conviction.
The Alien and Sedition Act's passage was encouraged by its drafters in
response to the perceived "fear and hostility in segments of the U.S. population"
attributed to the ideas brought forward in the French Revolution.39 They believed
the required showing of malicious intent and the defense of truth eliminated from
the Act undesirable aspects of English common law. 40 The constitutionality of the
Act was never decided by the Supreme Court, but it was upheld by lower federal
courts without dissent.4 The Act expired without renewal in 1801 .42
4.

The EnumeratedFreedoms in the Twentieth Century

The next challenge to the freedoms enumerated in the First Amendment
came by way of the Espionage Act of 19174' and the Sedition Act of 1918." The
Espionage Act, enacted two months following America's official entry into
World War I, prohibited various activities during times of war. 5 Criminal acts
included:
willfully mak[ing] or convey[ing] false reports or false statements with
intent to interfere with the ...

success

. .

of the United States or

promot[ing] the success of its enemies... caus[ing] or attempt[ing] to
cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the
military or naval forces of the United States, or ...willfully obstruct[ing]
the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States...

34.

Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, I Stat. 596, §§ 1-2.

35.

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 750.

36.
37.

STONE, supra note 7, at 997.
Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596, § 2.
38. Id. § 3; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 750.
39. STONE, supra note 7, at 997.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 219, tit. 1, § 3.
44. Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75,40 Stat. 553, § I.
45.

Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 219, tit. 1.

46.

Id. § 3.
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The Sedition Act, enacted merely eleven months following the Espionage
Act, criminalized writing or publishing anything:
disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language intended to cause
contempt or scorn for the form of government of the United States, the
Constitution, or the flag; to urge the curtailment of production of war
materials with the intent of hindering the war effort; or to utter any words
supporting the cause of any country at war with the United States. 7
Several notable cases were prosecuted under the Espionage Act for
possessing or publishing material considered in violation of it.4 1 In all,
approximately two thousand prosecutions were initiated by the government
during World War 1.49
The Acts above illustrate the routes taken by the government to restrict
speech deemed offensive to the system, both through restraining information
before it is published and criminal sanctions following publication. Although the
criminalization of some forms of speech still remains, prior restraint of
publication has consistently been held unconstitutional." However, prior restraint
of publication based on interests of national security received its first real
contemporary challenge in 1971 in the landmark case of New York Times v.
United States.5
5. The PentagonPapers and NationalSecurity: New York Times v. United
States
Between June 12 and June 18, 1971, the New York Times and the
Washington Post began publishing a series of articles containing a forty-sevenvolume Department of Defense study. 52 The study was coined the "Pentagon
Papers," and it was purported to include secret military information including

47. See STONE, supra note 7, at 1006 (detailing the provisions of the Sedition Act of 1918).
48. See, e.g., Shaffer v. United States, 255 F. 886 (9th Cir. 1919) (convicting Shaffer of violation for
mailing a book, "The Finished Mystery," containing "treasonable, disloyal, and seditious utterances ... "
Although Shaffer argued lack of intent, the court found presumed intent, "hostile attitude of his mind" regarding
the war and that the book was intentionally concealed on his premises). Id. Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 244 F.
535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (granting a journal publisher a preliminary injunction, forbidding the postmaster from
refusing to allow access to the United States mail and refusing to mail a monthly issue of the publication);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (affirming a conviction for sending a circular to men who had
been drafted urging them "to obstruct the recruiting and enlistment service.").
49.

STONE, supranote 7, at 1006.

50. See Neb. Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (declaring "prior restraints on speech and
publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights"); see also N.Y.
Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70
(1963) that prior restraint carries a heavy presumption against constitutional validity).
51. 403U.S.713(1971).
52. STONE, supra note 7, at 1077.
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detailed military operations and the content of diplomatic negotiations. 3 The
government sought to enjoin further publication of the transcripts to protect
national security.14 Only eighteen days following the government's request for
injunctive relief in the lower court, and following contradictory treatment by the
circuit courts, 5 the cases were consolidated for review. The Supreme Court ruled
that the injunction placed on the New York Times or the Washington Post was an
impermissible prior restraint under the First Amendment. 6
There were ten separate opinions written by the Court: a per curiam opinion
and a separate opinion by each Justice.5 ' The per curiam opinion simply stated
that the government failed to meet its burden of proof in light of the heavy
presumption that prior restraints on publication are impermissible under the
Constitution. 8
In separate concurring opinions, Justices Black and Douglas denied the use
of an injunction to stop publication. 9 Justice Black was particularly adverse to
using an injunction stating that "every moment's continuance of the injunctions
against these newspapers amounts to a flagrant, indefensible, and continuing
violation of the First Amendment., 60 Justice Douglas noted that "[t]he dominant
purpose of the First Amendment was to prohibit.., the widespread use of the
common law of seditious libel to punish the dissemination of material that is
embarrassing to the powers-that-be. 6' Whether these Justices would have so
ruled had they actually found proof of a threat to national security is debatable.
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion argued for the use of strict scrutiny in
cases of prior restraint and noted that the attempt to enjoin publication of the
Pentagon Papers, even for the time it took for the case to be heard by the Court,
fell far short of that standard. 62 Justices White and Stewart also concurred stating
that the government could not block publication of the information unless it
could show that the information would result in "direct, immediate, and
irreparable damage" to the Nation.63
Justice White specifically noted that, although an injunction could not be
issued to stop publication, 64 those who publish sensitive information are not

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See United States v. N.Y. Times Co., 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1971) (allowing injunction to estrain
publication); United States v. Wash. Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (affirming district court's denial
of injunctive relief).
56. N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 713-15.
57. Id. at 714.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 714-15, 723-24.
60. Id. at 714-15.
61. Id. at 723-24.
62. Id. at 725-27.
63. Id. at 730.
64. Id. at 740.
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alleviated of the threat of criminal sanctions on the basis of the content of
published material.65 In addition to the Espionage Act of 1917, several provisions
of the United States Code 66 provide for criminal penalties for unauthorized
possession or access to information which could be used to injure the United
States or secure an advantage to a foreign nation. 67
The dissenting opinions of Chief Justice Burger, Justice Harlan, and Justice
Blackman primarily focused on the lack of time given to review the material
allegedly constituting a threat to national security. 68 According to New York
Times the court is not likely to stop or prohibit publication based on national
security concerns unless the "direct, immediate and irreparable harm" standard is
met. 9
Throughout the two centuries since the drafting of the First Amendment,
freedom of the press has endured great changes which have both contracted and
expanded the scope of its boundary. 0 The First Amendment may have been an
outright rejection of the restrictions of English law or simply a template to meet
the demands of a growing and changing democracy.7
B. The Boundaries ofAccess to Information and the Freedom of Information
Act
Although the New York Times Court held that the government may not place
prior restraints on publication, the freedom of the press has been limited by other
rulings of the Court.72 The Court has held that, except in criminal trials,73 the
Constitution does not confer any special rights upon the press to access or gather
information.74 In fact, the Court has specifically noted that, although the press has
the right to gather news in any manner within the law, it "has never intimated a
First Amendment guarantee of a right of access to all sources of information

65.
66.
67.

Id. at 735-40.
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 792-799 (West 2000).
See, e.g., N.Y Times, 403 U.S. at 737 n.8 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 793(e), which pmvides that:
[w]hoever having unauthorized possession of, access to,or control over any document,
writing... or information relating to the national defense which information the possessor
has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of
any foreign nation, willfully communicates ...the same to any person not entitled to receive
it ...is guilty of an offense punishable by 10 years in prison, a $10,000 fine, or both).
68. Id. at 748-63.
69. Id. at 730.
70. Supra Part II.A. 1-4.
71. Supra Part II.A.3.
72. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) (noting that the Constitution does not require
the government to allow the press more access to information than that afforded to the general public); Saxbe v.
Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 843 (1974) (upholding regulations prohibiting the press from interviewing
particular inmates).
73. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
74. Supra note 72.
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within governmental control., 75 According to the Court, the First Amendment
does not compel the government to supply the press with information."
Essentially, the right of the press to gather information is generally the same as
those of the public and may be limited accordingly. 7
However, the freedom to access information pertaining to government
functioning still constitutes primary importance. in a, democratic system of the
people. This right to information was enumerated by statute in 1966 through the
adoption of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).7 9 The Act, one of the
primary channels of information-gathering for the press and for ordinary citizens,
is based on the premise that access to government information is essential for
citizens of a democracy to make informed decisions. 0
FOIA allows any citizen to obtain federal agency records upon written
request."' While most records are obtainable, a federal agency may refuse to
release information under nine legal categories exempted by law.82 One of these
categories explicitly exempts disclosure of information classified for purposes of
national defense and security. 3 For example, non-disclosure of confidential
information has been held constitutional where the information pertains to
"secret" internal governmental affairs.8 4 These exemptions are not mandatory. 5
Although not a complete authority for public access to any government information,

75. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 11.
78. Infra note 80.
79. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 1996 & Supp. 2002).
80. See H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at 6-7 (1996) (noting the importance of the FOIA, its historical
evolution, and the need for an informed public); see also Cent. Intelligence Agency v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 182
(1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting the FOIA, "established a broad mandate for disclosure of governmental
information by requiring that all materials be made public 'unless explicitly allowed to be kept secret by one of
the exemptions ... ' (quoting S. REP. No. 89-813, at 10 (1965)). Justice Marshall also stated that, "Congress, it
is clear, sought to assure that the Government would not operate behind a veil of secrecy, and it narrowly
tailored the exceptions to the fundamental goal of disclosure." Id.
81. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552.
82. Id. § 552(b); see also American Civil Liberties Union, Using The Freedom Of Information Act: A
Step-by-Step Guide, 5-8, available at http://www.aclu.org/library/foia.html (copy on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (listing the exempted records as those addressing national security, internal agency rules,
information specifically exempted by another statute, confidential business information, internal government
memos, private matters, law enforcement investigations, regulation of financial institutions, and geologcal and
geophysical information regarding oil well locations).
83. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(l)(A).
84. See, e.g., Sims, 471 U.S. at 159 (discussing the withholding of "secret information" contained in CIA
brainwashing and interrogation projects); see also Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 20, 1995)
(defining "national security" and setting standards for classification of government information for purposes of
national security).
85. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(1)(A), (b)(3) (noting exceptions to disclosure requirements including "specifically
authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign
policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order' and matters specifically exempted from
disclosure where there is no discretion on the issue and the department specifically establishes criteria for withholding
information or refers to the types of matter to be withheld).
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the FOIA requires the government to bear the burden of proof upon denial of any
request, thereby creating an effective means for any citizen to access non-exempt
information.86
The FOIA has undergone various amendments since its inception,
delineating its scope and clarifying the requirements of government agencies
charged with providing information to the public in a timely fashion.87 Notably,
the Electronic Freedom of Information Amendments, of 199688 carves out a
provision for expedited processing of agency requests for the press. When the
requesting party is a person primarily engaged in disseminating information,
records may be received within ten days if a "compelling need," defined as "an
urgency to inform the public concerning actual or alleged Federal Government
activity," is shown.
In sum, prior to 9-11, the boundaries of the press and the public's right to
access government information appeared relatively clear. In New York Times,
despite the extraordinary circumstances of the case, the United States Supreme
Court explicitly rejected the application of historical laws restricting the press
and held that a prior restraint of publication is unconstitutional.90 Through the
FOIA, Congress codified the right to access any government information not
expressly exempted by statute. 9 Moreover, in light of the fact that the public and
the press have the right to access this information, any information withheld for
purposes of national security must be specifically exempted by statute or
classified according to executive order. 92
However, following the terrorists attacks of 9-11, open access to government
information by the press and the public, previously determined to be
constitutionally guaranteed, clearly conflicts with the need to withhold
information for the security of the nation.93 The resolution of this conflict
necessitates inquiry into how to protect the liberties of the press and the public as
enumerated in the Constitution, while at the same time ensuring national
security. 94

86.

H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at 6.

87.

Id. at 7-11.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(2)(E) (West 1996 & Supp. 2002).
Id.
403 U.S. 713.
5 U.S.C.A. § 552.
Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
See infra Part IV (describing the nation's need for information versus national security).
Id.
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III. THE WAR ON TERRORISM AND THE RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS TO
INFORMATION FOLLOWING THE 9-11 ATTACKS

As our Nation continues its campaign to eradicate the threat of terror within
its borders and abroad, the importance of access to information about the
progression of this campaign is immediate. If, as ta democratic society, the
peoples' will is expressed through the actions of governmental leaders, access to
information necessary to carry out that charge is critical. This ideal was
illuminated by Chief Justice Hughes in 1937 when he stated:
The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from
incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the
more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights
of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the
opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may
be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may
be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic,
the very foundation of constitutional government. 95
However, as evidenced by several noteworthy restrictions placed on the
access to information, prior to and immediately following the 9-11 terrorist
attacks, the right of the press and the public to gain access to government
information has been severely restricted for purposes of "national security." 96
A. Freedom of the Press, the Right to GatherNews, and the Use of the "Press
Pool"
Although the press has never secured the "right" to gather news in any
manner it deems appropriate, there has long been a symbiotic but tenuous
relationship between the military and the press. However, the current method of
reporting on military operations can hardly be categorized as "free" press in the
manner arguably intended by the framers of the Constitution.
Beginning with the widespread coverage of the Vietnam war, the United
States Department of Defense and members of the press have continually sparred
over access to information, or the lack thereof, and the nature of what may be
reported regarding United States military operations.97 Historically, in both World

95. See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937) (noting the opposition of the Court to punishing a
man for attending a lawful meeting held by Communists).
96. See infra Part ll.A-C (discussing restrictions placed on press access to wartime coverage such as
restrictions on access to government map, satellite, and photographic information, and the government's
approval of denial of FOIA requests).
97. See Malcolm W. Browne, The Military vs. The Press: A Correspondent's A-count, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 1991, (Magazine), at 27 (detailing the correspondent's, who covered wars in Vietnam, Cambodia,
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War II and Vietnam, members of the press had relative freedom to report on
American forces in action.98 Although press reports were censored by the military
for sensitive material, the reporters were given wide access to both combat and
troops.9 9 But due to widespread reporting of the government's failures in the
Vietnam war, notwithstanding President Lyndon Johnson's assurances of a
"winnable" war, the press was viewed by the Department of Defense as a force to
be reckoned with and not to be ignored. 0 As a result, during the military
conflicts in Grenada and Panama, the press was completely left behind.'0
The Department of Defense, responding to the objections of the media
regarding their complete lack of access, instituted an elaborate system of "press
pools" designed to limit the concern over potential "security" breaches.' 2 The
press pool is essentially a select group of reporters and photojournalists who are
allowed access to war zones in exchange for an agreement to comply with
Department of Defense requirements.' 03
The use of press pools was implemented in 1990 and continued throughout
the Gulf War.' °4 However, due to the requirements that reporters sign the
agreement to comply with "guidelines" and "ground rules" which, among other
restrictions, included a binding agreement to allow a security review of
everything reported, many reporters were disillusioned with the Department of
Defense's management of press relations. Reporters had to be accompanied by an
"escort" at all times,' and their reports were censored capriciously for any
material deemed a security risk.'0 6

Punjab, Bangladesh, North Africa, and Latin America, account of his participation in reporting on the Gulf
War).
98. See Jason DeParle, After the War, Long Series of Military Decisions Led to Gulf War News
Censorship, Part One, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1991, at A9 (discussing the historical background of using press
pools for media coverage of war).
99. Id. (noting the decision to confine reporters to "official pools" in the Gulf War "represented a
departure not only from Vietnam, but also from World War II.").
100. Id. (noting that the military had been thinking about the press long before the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait and quoting retired Major General Winant Sidle, chief military spokesman, as stating, "[o]ne thing
Vietnam did to us is nobody says, 'Oh, don't worry about public affairs."').
101. Id.
102. Browne, supra note 97 at 2-3.
103. Id.
104. See DeParle, supra note 98 (discussing press coverage in the Persian Gulf).
105. Browne, supra note 97, at 5-7.
106. See id. (detailing his account of "censorship" of material). After Browne and his colleague
submitted their dispatches to an escort officer, who found nothing within it to censor or flag as objectionable,
they were awoken at three o'clock in the morning by a wing commander who had spotted passages he regarded
as improper. Id. None of the passages had anything to do with security. Id. "In Frank's copy, the adjective
,giddy,' used to describe the pilots, ha[d] been changed to 'proud."' Id. In the author's own copy, the words
"fighter-bomber" had been changed to "fighter." Id. After agreeing to the proposed changes, on the condition
that the copy be immediately sent to the pool headquarters in Dhahran, the authors found out the next morning
that the copy had actually been sent to officials in Nevada, who determined everything the journalists wrote was
a breach of security. Id.
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As a result of these strict requirements, many reporters simply gave up hope
of receiving any quality time in the field, or reporting significant information as a
member of a press pool in the Gulf War and decided to travel on their own, in
direct violation of Saudi and American military regulations.' 7 Several reporters
were caught in violation of the law, jailed, and threatened with revocation of their
press credentials and visas. '
The media has expressed its concern to the Department of Defense over the
Department "inhibit[ing] news coverage of combat operations by forcing
reporters and photojournalists into small pools under the control of military
officials and by attempting to exercise editorial control over news content."' 09
Reporters also seriously question whether the Department of Defense's policy on
war coverage is prudent when conflicts are presented to the American public in a
way that makes them appear "painless" when in fact thousands of people may
have died."0 The war was portrayed in such a detached manner that the public
had no way of knowing the number of casualties which may have ranged from
fifty to one hundred thousand."' Another reporter, Malcolm Browne, lamented
that the press pool system in the Gulf War made journalists "essentially unpaid
employees of the Department of Defense."' 12 Days before the start of the Gulf
War, nine news organizations protested and filed a lawsuit challenging the rules
governing press pools." 3 However, by the time the suit reached the courts, the
Gulf War was over, and the issue therefore became moot."4
In 1992, the Pentagon and the news media reached an agreement about how
the press would cover military operations."' The agreement stated that "open and
independent" reporting would be the norm and provided guidelines for the
relationship between the Department of Defense and the press." 6 Provisions
allowing journalists access to all major military units, including special forces,
where feasible, were included."17 The agreement also allowed reporters to use

107. Id.
108. Id. (noting that three reporters from the New York Times, one from The Wasington Post, two
from the Associated Press, and one from Cox Newspapers, among others, were all arrested and detained by
American military authorities at some point during the Gulf War).
109. The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Letter to Bush Administration and CongrasionalLeaders
Regarding War Coverage Oct. 17, 2001, available at http:/Avww.cfp.org/news/documents/20011017msfeldhtml
[hereinafter Letter to Bush Administration](copy on file with the McGeorge Law Revie).
110. See DeParle, supra note 98 (noting the comments of Ted Koppel, host of the ABC News program
"Nightline," regarding the policy on war coverage).
11. Id.
112. The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Journalists Worry About Restrictions, Access
in Impending War, Sept. 26, 2001, available at http://www.rcfp.org/news/2001/0926defens.html [hereinafter
JournalistsWorry About Restrictions] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Letter toBush Administration,supra note 109, at 2.
116. Id.
117. Id.

McGeorgeLaw Review / Vol. 33
their own communications systems to file reports from the field and authorized
reporting without restrictions except in "extreme circumstances.""'
Following the 9-1 1 terrorist attacks and the start. of the War on Terrorism,
members of the press called upon the Department of Defense to adhere to the
1992 agreement. "9 But for nearly three months, the press did not succeed in
securing cooperation from the Department. Trouble began almost immediately
after the attacks when reporters and photographers were ushered away from the
World Trade Center. 2 ' Although reported as isolated incidents, cameras and film
were threatened with citation or
were confiscated by police, and reporters
22
actually cited for entering restricted areas.1
Coverage of the start of the War on Terrorism fared no better. Reporters and
photojournalists were kept out of Afghanistan and most of the surrounding region
until the end of November 2001,23 because the Department of Defense and
of the media were debating the proper timing to introduce the
representatives
12142
press. In the meantime, secret maneuvers were undertaken by the military. 5
For example, the October 19th raid by special forces was not confirmed by the
Department of Defense, even after it was complete and the information had
already been leaked by an insider. 26 On October 22nd, Secretary of Defense,
Donald Rumsfeld, denounced whoever leaked information about the raids to the27
public and stated the leak could have caused the death of American soldiers.
However, the broadcasts regarding the October 19th raid were aired after it
occurred, arguably lessening the need for secrecy because the Taliban already
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Journalists Worry About Restrictions, supra note 112; Letter to Bush Administration,supra note

109.
119. Letter to Bush Administration,supranote 109.
120. The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Press Optimistic About Improved Wartime
Access, Dec. 19, 2001, available at http://www.rcfp.org/news/2001/1219pentag.html [hereinafter Press
Optimistic About Improved Wartime Access] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting the first
break in restricted coverage of the War on Terrorism came on November 27, 2001, almost three months after
the 9-11 terrorist attacks on America).
121. The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Sporadic Press Restrictions Seen in Aftermath
of TerroristAttacks, Sept. 19, 2001, available at http://www.rcfp.org/news/2001/0919journa.html (copy on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
122. Id.
123. Press Optimistic About Improved Wartime Access supra note 120, at 5.
124. The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Pentagon Rejects Mixing Media With Ground
Troops, Nov. 13, 2001, available at http://www.rcfp.org/news/2001/1113offici.html [hereinafter Pentagon
Rejects Mixing Media With Ground Troops] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing concern
over allowing access to journalists because of security concerns and the possibility that publicity could cause
"political unrest").
125. The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Latest Media-MilitaryRoundtable Offers Press
Few Wartime Concessions, Oct. 25, 2001, available at http://www.rcfp.org/news/2001/1025bureau.html
[hereinafter Latest Media-MilitaryRoundtable] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Revie).
126. Id.
127. Id.
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knew about it. Concurrently, the Department of Defense 28 was still discussing
putting press pools in the area, but no decisions were made.'
On November 8, 2001, members of the press held a seminar at the Brookings
Institution to discuss with military officials the need for greater wartime access.129
The officials continued to refuse access to reporters, claiming concern that
publicity could cause political unrest in the region."O Finally on November 27,
2001, reporters from the, Associated Press, Reuters, and Gannett newspapers
were allowed to accompany soldiers into the field. 3 '
On December 6, 2001, reporters were locked in a warehouse to prevent them2
from covering troops killed or wounded by a stray bomb north of Kandahar.1
The Pentagon apologized in writing stating a decision was made in the field in
the heat of battle and that decision was to err on the side of caution. "'
Perhaps the most intriguing restriction of information came not as a direction
from a federal government agency but from the press itself. Following a request
by the White House, network executives at ABC News, CBS News, NBC News,
Fox News, and CNN all agreed not to air unedited, videotaped statements from
Osama Bin Laden and his followers. 34 The executives also agreed to remove from the
taped segments "language the government consider[ed] inflammatory." 3
In sum, from September 11 through November 27, 2001, reporters were
prohibited from entering the site of the World Trade Center attack 36 and
restricted from reporting from Afghanistan,'37 effectively precluding reports on
and details of American involvement in the area. Moreover, the press itself
restricted its own content at the request of the government.'38 Throughout this
period of time, the government also took action to restrict access by the press and
the public to information deemed sensitive in light of the attacks on 9-11 ."
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file with the McGeorge Law Review).
135. Id.
136. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text (describing the way reporters were handled by the
police after the World Trade Center was attacked).
137. See supra Part I1I.A (illustrating how reporters were kept out of Afghanistan).
138. See supra Part I11.A (describing how news executives decided not to air videotapes from Osama
Bin Laden).
139. See supra Part 1LI.A (detailing government action to restrict wartime coverage); infra Part II.B
(discussing government restrictions on maps and satellite images).

McGeorgeLaw Review / Vol. 33
B. Restrictions on Maps, SatelliteImages, and Photographs
Government agencies blocked access to information in many areas in
reaction to the 9-11 attacks, an obvious example being the curtailing of access to
maps and satellite images of Afghanistan. Following 9-11, the Department of
Defense bought an exclusive contract with the only domestic provider of highresolution satellite images of Afghanistan. ' Likewise, the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency, created in 1996 to perform the mapping and imagery services
for the Department of Defense and American intelligence agencies, blocked
access to and prohibited the selling of or copying of all their topographical
maps. 14' The restrictions included directing the U.S. Geological Survey and the
Federal Aviation Administration to terminate sales of maps and directing the
Library of Congress and the National Archives and Records Administration to
deny public access to these maps.142
Government agencies also blocked access to information considered a threat43
to national security by removing such information from their Internet websites.'
For example, the Department of Energy's Office of Defense Programs page was
completely removed from the National Nuclear Security Administration's
website.' 44 Information regarding national water supplies, energy facilities, and
nuclear energy was also removed4 along with reports detailing the safety, or lack
thereof, at chemical plants.'4 6 Access to information at agencies such as the
Protection Agency, and the
Federal Aviation Administration, Environmental
47
restricted.
also
was
Service
Internal Revenue

140. The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, U.S. Military Takes Over Satellite Photos of
Afghanistan, Oct. 19, 2001, available at http://www.rcfp.org/news/2001/1019defens.html (copy on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
141. The Reporters Committee For Freedom of the Press, Government Mapping Agency Blocks Access
to CertainMaps, Oct. 3, 2001, availableat http://www.rcfp.org/news/2001/1003mappin.html (copy on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
142. See id. (restricting NIMA-made maps, but allowing some nautical and aeronautical maps to be
available for navigation).
143. See OMB Watch, The Post-September 11 Environment: Access to Government MIformation, at
http://www.ombwatch.org/info/2001/access.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (listing restrictions placed on access to government information following 9-11 with corresponding
responsible government agencies).
144. Id.
145. See id. (noting information was removed from the U.S. Geological Survey (water resources), the
Department of Energy's "Information Bridge" database, and the National Nuclear Security Administration's
website).
146. See id. (noting (1) the restriction on access to Federal Aviation Administration information
including "records of accidents and incidents, pilot and maintenance training schools .. . and data on
enforcement actions," (2) the restrictions on Environmental Protection Agency information including risk
management plans, and (3) the restrictions on access to Internal Revenue Service reading rooms).
147. Id.
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C. Restrictions on Freedom of Information Act Requests
Beginning in 1966 with, the passage of the FOIA, the right of the public to access
government information has been guaranteed.14 However, notwithstanding the
mandatory disclosure provisions of the FOIA, government agencies may
withhold information for purposes of national security,' 9 a decision often subject
to the determination of the agency itself.5 ° Following the 9-11 terrorist attacks,
that discretion was substantially enhanced and defended by the Office of the
Attorney General.
On October 12, 2001, United States Attorney General, John Ashcroft,
rescinded a government-wide directive, put in place in 1993 by then Attorney
General, Janet Reno, mandating minimal use of FOIA exemptions.'' Ashcroft
noted that agencies who decide to withhold records could "be assured that the
Department of Justice will defend their decisions.' 52 The conflict evident
between the right of the public to information and issues of national security was
also addressed by Ashcroft who wrote, "the 'Department of Justice and this
Administration are committed to full compliance with the Freedom of
Information Act' and acknowledged that 'only through a well-informed
citizenry' can national leaders remain accountable or the American people be
assured that 'neither fraud nor government waste is concealed."" 53
The Ashcroft memorandum then states "that the department and
administration are 'equally committed' to other values, among them 'national
security, enhancing the effectiveness of our law enforcement agencies, protecting
sensitive business information and, not least, protecting personal privacy."""
However, Ashcroft also stated that "[o]nly if [the agency's] decisions lack a
'sound legal basis' or could lead to an unfavorable court decision that might
impair the government's ability to deny records in the future, would the
department not support denials."' 55
Attorney General Ashcroft's additional considerations under which FOIA
requests will be approved or denied is in direct conflict with the stated purpose of
the Act which is to establish the presumptive right of the public to access
government information subject to the limitations specifically delineated within

148. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 1996 & Supp. 2002) (noting that "[e]ach agency shall make [information]
available to the public....').
149. See id. § 552 (b) (noting exceptions to the mandatory disclosure provision of 5 U.S.C. § 552).
150. H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at 6 (1996) (noting that individual agencies are responsible for processing
FOIA requests and that the Department of Justice oversees agency compliance with FOIA).
151. The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Ashcroft Promises Support for FOI Act
Denials, Oct. 18, 2001, available at http://www.rcfp.org/news/2001/1018azgmemo.html [hereinafter Ashcroft
Promises Support] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
152. See id. (contrasting the Ashcroft memorandum with the 1993 Reno memorandum).
153. Id.
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the Act itself' 5 6 Historically, the burden of proof to show the need to withhold
information in such cases was placed on the agency."' Under the 1993 Reno
memorandum, the relevant standard constituted a showing that it was reasonably
foreseeable that disclosure would be harmful. 5 ' Following the October 12, 2001
announcement by the Justice Department, decisions denying disclosure will be
upheld unless "they lack a sound legal basis."' 9 In general, it seems likely this
showing will be met.
IV. THE CONSTITUTION AND NATIONAL SECURITY: How FAR IS TOO FAR?

Freedom of the press and access to government information is vital to the
success of a growing and changing democracy.' 60 However, during a national
security crisis, situations may arise when no choice exists but to temporarily
forego some civil liberties in order to ensure the safety of our democratic
system.' 6' For example, according to the Espionage and Censorship Act,
disclosure of information such as locations of military installations, photographs
locations,
of such
62 disclosure of locations of ground troops is punishable by
crimial
• and
Likewise, under the exceptions of the FOIA, a
criminal sanctions.
governmental agency may choose to withhold any information pertaining to
national security.16 Arguably, even the freedom of the press may be lawfully
abridged in cases where the disclosure of information would cause irreparable
harm to the security of the nation.',
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159. Id.
160. See N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that
[in the absence of the governmental checks and balances present in other areas of our
national life, the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power in the areas of
national defense and international affairs may lie in an informed citizenry-in an informed
and critical public opinion which alone can here protect the values of democratic
government.).
161. Id. (stating:
[i]t is elementary that the successful conduct of international diplomacy and the maintenance
of an effective national defense require both confidentiality and secrecy ... [a]nd within our
own executive departments, the development of considered and intelligent international
policies would be impossible if those charged with their formulation could not communicate
with each other freely, frankly, and in confidence. In the area of basic national defense the
frequent need for absolute secrecy is, of course, self-evident).
162. 18 U.S.C.A. § 792-99 (West 2000).
163. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(1)(A) (West 1996 & Supp. 2002).
164. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (noting that otherwise lawful speech may lose
constitutional protection during times of war); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (noting that speech
inciting violence and overthrow of the government by force may be suppressed to ensure the security of the
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2002 / Convergence of the FirstAmendment
Although recent restrictions responded to serious breakdowns in national
security,'65 they may be unconstitutional under the First Amendment., 66 Broad
categorizing of some of the recent restrictions on the press and the public to
access information as constitutional under the umbrella of "national security" is
questionable.167 In some of these cases, the line between withholding information
for purposes of "national security" and plain "censorship" is very unclear.16' A
compelling question is also presented concerning whether the limits placed on
the gathering of information nullifies the New York Times decision upholding the
unconstitutionality of prior restraint.
It is apparent, under New York Times, that any prior restraint on publication
requires a showing of "direct, immediate, and irreparable damage" to the security
of the nation.'69 In the context of recent events, the government's attempt to force
the press to withhold publication of the contents of the Bin Laden tapes would
not withstand a constitutional review under New York Times unless the
government could show irreparable harm would immediately follow publication
of their content."7 However, in light of the fact the press itself chose to withhold
the tapes, any constitutional analysis is precluded. 7 '
Nevertheless, it seems the restrictions placed on access to government
information through satellite photographs and Internet sites have a less tenuous
basis than a broad ban on reporting of information related to the 9-11 attacks, and
thus, would likely withstand constitutional review. "2 The United States Criminal
Code provides sound authority for withholding pictures of military installations
and operations. "' Restrictions placed on access to government websites are
entirely defensible because both Congress and the President have specifically
exempted from disclosure information pertaining to military operations, maps,
and details of the infrastructure
of the nation through the exemptions of the FOIA
74
and by Executive Order.

165. See Latest Media-Military Roundtable, supra note 125 (noting that security leaks could have cost
American lives).
166. See Letter to Bush Administration, supra note 109 (suggesting steps the government should take
honoring its First Amendment obligations).
167. See id. (stating that overclassification dulls the ability to determine what really needs protection).
168. See supra Part III (discussing the sweeping restrictions on newsgathering, the withdrawal of access
to government agency information, and the change in standards forreview of FOIA requests).
169. See supra Part II.A (discussing the Supreme Court's reversal of an injunction enjoining the
publication of military transcripts).
170. Id.
171. See supra Part III.B (noting that the press voluntarily complied with the request from the White
House).
172. Id.
173. 18 U.S.C.A. § 795(a) (West 2000).
174. See supraPart II.B (discussing the methods of limiting access by legal means).
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The conditions placed on the gathering of news following the 9-11 attacks
are also questionable restraints because, while the press has never secured the
right to access any information desired, 7 ' some of the restrictions, in effect,
prevented the press from gathering any information, beyond news that could be
deemed a risk to national security.'76
Strikingly, more than three months passed between the 9-11 attacks and the
lifting of restrictions on the press reporting on the War on Terrorism.' It is
simply not plausible that every instance of reportable news occurring during this
period of time and relevant to the 9-1 1 attacks would threaten the security of the
Nation. Therefore, it seems that during this three-month ban the press was
unconstitutionally restricted from reporting on any information whatsoever.
While arguably the freedoms enumerated by the First Amendment may not
encompass a carte blanch right of the press to gather information, 7 1 it is difficult
to determine how these restrictions are all constitutional and do not, in effect,
constitute a "prior restraint" on publication based on content in the manner
addressed in by the Supreme Court in New York Times.'79 When the press was
blocked from reporting wartime activities for nearly three months following 911,'" this precluded any review of whether potential newsworthy articles could
be published. Contrary to the apparent limitation of the press through the use of
broad denial of access and the use of press pools,'' many would argue that when
faced with a national crisis the press should
have more access to military
82
operations and information, rather than less.'
The position taken by the Department of Defense on restricting access
through FOIA requests is arguably the least defensible restriction following the
9-11 attacks. From its enactment, the FOIA was intended to provide both a
presumptive right to access government information and the means through
which both ordinary persons and members of the press may do so.
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information was narrowly tailored in order to ensure this right would not be

175. See supra notes 72-75 (noting that the press has the same right to access information as the public
at large).
176. See supra Part III.A (discussing the complete ban on access to the conflict in Afghanistan, the use
of press pools, and censorship of news reports).
177. See supra Part III.A (noting that restrictions were in place almost immediately after 9-11 and
remained until November 27, 2001).
178. Supra notes 72-75.
179. Supra Part II.A.5; see N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 714 (stating that, where the United States sought to
enjoin publication of the contents of a classified study "any system of prior restraints of expression comes to
this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity").
180. Supra Part III.A.
181. Id.
182. Letter to Bush Administratio, supra note 109 (noting "a free and autonomous press is as central to
the preservation of democracy as is a strong military. Indeed, news organizations have a distinguished history in
this country of providing the public with essential information during times of warfare and national crisis.").
183. H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at 6-7.
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abridged by the government.14 In the 1993 Reno memorandum, the standard used
to determine whether records could be withheld was "foreseeable harm."' 85
Following the recent Ashcroft memorandum, the standard now appears to be
whether the agency's decision "lacks a sound legal basis."' 86
The tenuous nature of this pronouncement is clear upon examination of the
historical basis of the FOIA and the explicitly stated showing required by a
government agency to justify the withholding of information under the FOIA
exemptions. The Court and Congress have repeatedly stated that the exemptions
to the FOIA must be narrowly tailored so as not to impede its fundamental goal
of providing information pertaining to government functioning to whoever
desires it, regardless of their purpose." 7 Moreover, the burden of proof
necessitating the withholding of information under a specific exemption lies with
the agency, not with the person seeking records. 8 The Ashcroft memorandum,
by advocating broad support of agency denials, appears to shift that burden to
members of the public seeking information'89 and runs counter to the central
purpose of the FOIA, which is broad disclosure.
V. CONCLUSION

Historically, the constitutionally guaranteed First Amendment freedoms have
been in conflict with the necessary task of the government of protecting the
security of a democratic Nation. Following the 9-11 terrorist attacks, it appears
that a serious breakdown in security necessitates once again examining the role
of the First Amendment in protecting our right to a free press and to free access
to information.
The Supreme Court, Congress, and the Executive Branch have delicately
balanced the goal of upholding the restriction on prior restraint of publication and
public access to information while criminally punishing those who would violate
the security of the Nation. But, as evidenced by the immediate restrictions placed
on the press and the withholding of information from the public following the 9-11
attacks, the possibility of overarching reaction is evident, placing the rights guaranteed
by the First Amendment in jeopardy. As stated by Justice Black in New York Times,
"[t]he word 'security' is a broad, vague generality whose contours should not be
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190. See supraPart Ill (discussing restrictions placed on information after 9-11).

McGeorge Law Review / VoL 33
invoked to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment. The
guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed
representative government provides no real security for our Republic."''
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